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THE UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT
JAMES M. PERRY *
The various issues raised in connection with descent and
distribution of property where persons perish in a common
disaster and title depends upon priority 6f death, while not
encountered every day in legal practice, can present many
complications when they arise.
The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act passed at the recent
session of the South Carolina Legislature and which became
law April 3, 194S, is, therefore, of special interest.
In 1940 the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act was ap-
proved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. At the close of the 1947 Legislative sessions,
the Act had been adopted in thirty states, I South Carolina
being the thirty-first state to adopt the Uniform Act.
Briefly stated, it provides that where persons die in a
common disaster and there is no sufficient evidence of sur-
vivorship, the property of each person shall be disposed of
as though he had survived, with the following exceptions:
Where, under a will or otherwise, two or more benefici-
aries are designated to take successively, the property is di-
vided among them equally and distributed to those who would
have taken had each designated beneficiary survived.
In cases of joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety, the
property is divided among the tenants equally and distrib-
uted as though each had survived.
The remaining exception relates to the proceeds of life or
accident insurance policies. Where an insured and his bene-
ficiary die simultaneously, the insured is considered to have
survived the beneficiary and the proceeds of the insurance
policy are distributed accordingly.
The Act is inapplicable where the contingency of certain
Member of South Carolina Bar. Firm of Haynsworth & Haynsworth, Greenville, S. 0.
1. Adopted in: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
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persons dying in a common disaster is otherwise provided
for by will, trust, deed or insurance contract.
It will be observed that the Act does not change or affect
the law with respect to proof of survivorship, but merely de-
clares the law governing the disposition of property in the
event of death in a common disaster where there is no suf-
ficient proof of survivorship.
There are only three reported South Carolina decisions
where simultaneous death was an issue in connection with the
distribution of property and two of these cases related to
the sufficiency of proof as to survivorship.
Under the common law, there was no presumption of sur-
vivorship, this being a fact to be proved by the party assert-
ing it.
This rule also obtains in South Carolina, as established by
the decision in Pell v. Ball, 2 a leading case on the question.
In that case, a Mr. and Mrs. Ball, husband and wife, em-
barked at Charleston on a steamer which was destroyed by
the explosion of one of the boilers. A large number of passen-
gers were lost, including Mr. and Mrs. Ball. An action was
brought in connection with the settlement of Mr. Ball's es-
tate wherein it was alleged that the wife survived the hus-
band. The Court held that the burden was on the plaintiffs
who claimed through Mrs. Ball to prove that she was the sur-
vivor. On the trial of the case, a number of witnesses testi-
fied that immediately after the explosion they saw Mrs. Ball
frantically searching for her husband and calling his name
in loud tones of despair. Mr. Ball was never seen or heard of
following the explosion. On the basis of these facts the Court
held there was sufficient proof that Mrs. Ball had survived her
husband.
The opinion written by Chancellor Johnson in Pell v. Ball,
supra, is a very interesting one and in it he discusses some
of the perplexing problems facing the courts in those cases
where survivorship could not be proved, saying: " * * * Where
the right is mutual, it may be safest, and perhaps, in some in-
stances, the rule should be * * * to abstain from anything ap-
proaching conjecture, and leave the right untouched, unless
it can be shown, by reasonable evidence, that the party who
is to take derivatively, was the survivor."
Continuing, however, the Court stated, "But there are in-
2. Pell v. Ball, 15 S. C. Eq. (Cheves) 99.
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stances, such as cross remainders, and partnerships, and such
as would have arisen on joint tenancies before the abolition of
the jus accrescendi, * * * where there must be a decision, and
to which the rule just mentioned cannot be applied, without in
fact deciding for one of the parties, and against the other, by
refusing to decide at all; and where indeed this may not be the
only consequence. * * *"
These instances which gave Chancellor Johnson such con-
cern are now specifically provided for under the Uniform Act.
Faced with the problem of deciding upon some basis for
the distribution of estates, where there was no proof of sur-
vivorship, the courts naturally gave great consideration to
any evidence which might tend to prove survivorship and va-
rious presumptions were indulged in. Again quoting from Pell
v. Ball, supra: " * * * the English and American courts have
hitherto carefully avoided the adoption of any rule of de-
cision. The cases have gone off on compromise, or were decided
upon a rule adapted to the nature of the question before the
court, and not to the question of right, as transmitted by sur-
vivorship. * * * I think I may safely conclude, that * * * 'the
English law has hitherto waived the question.' I am not, how-
ever, prepared to abandon, as delusive, all effort to attain
rules capable of deciding the fact of survivorship, even in
cases denominated conjectural. * * * Indeed, there will gener-
ally be found something in the condition of the parties, their
age, strength, health, and habits, which will, in some degree at
least, rescue the decision from the imputation of rash conjec-
ture, and place it rather upon the foundation of evidence and
probability, than tremulous presumption. But where there is
any evidence whatever, even though it be but a shadow, it
must govern in the decision of the fact."
There appears to have been no further South Carolina de-
cisions on this question until the case of Nolf v. Patton 3 In
that case one George Nolf and his wife and baby were burned
to death in a fire which destroyed the home in which they
lived. All were burned beyond recognition, but examination
of the body of the husband disclosed an indentation about an
inch thick at the back of his head, apparently having been
made by some blunt instrument similar to that of the head
of a hatchet or hammer. The bodies of Mrs. Nolf and the baby
were found in the kitchen while that of Mr. Nolf was found in
3. Nolf v. Patton, 114 S. C. 323, 103 S. E. 528.
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the dining room with his head toward his bedroom. The plain-
tiffs as heirs at law of the husband brought suit for distri-
bution of the estate, alleging that the husband was the sur-
vivor. The defendants as heirs at law of Mrs. Nolf contended
that Mrs. Nolf and the baby were the survivors. The case was
submitted to the jury who found for the defendants, which
was the equivalent of finding that the wife and baby survived.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that the burden was on
the plaintiffs to prove the allegations of their complaint, to-
wit, that the husband survived, saying: "There is nothing in
the case of Pell v. Ball, Cheves Eq. 99, upon which the appel-
lants rely, inconsistent with that principle." The Court also
held that the verdict of the jury was sustained by the evidence
and did not rest upon conjecture.
It will be observed that in the two cases just discussed, to-
wit, Pell v. Ball and Nolf v. Patton, the question on appeal
related to the sufficiency of proof of survivorship and its de-
termination was substantially influenced by the incidence of
the burden of proof. The Court in those cases managed to
avoid facing the question of what disposition would have been
made of the deceased's property, had death been simultaneous.
The only decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court
on the subject of the proper distribution of property in the
event of simultaneous death is that of Collins v. Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Company. 4 In that case a Mr. and Mrs. Ander-
son, husband and wife, were instantly killed when the car in
which they were riding was struck by defendant's train. The
plaintiff, as administrator, brought suit for the benefit of the
heirs at law of Mrs. Anderson to recover damages for her al-
leged wrongful death. The Railroad Company moved for a non-
suit on the ground that the husband and wife perished in a
common disaster; that the action Was brought on the theory
that Mrs. Anderson survived and there was no proof to this
effect. Plaintiff took the position that the action was based on
the theory that Mr. and Mrs. Anderson died at the same in-
stant of time and, therefore, the only persons to take under
the Statute were the heirs at law of Mrs. Anderson.
On appeal from the order of the Trial Court overruling
the motion, the Supreme Court held there was no testimony
to show that Mr. Anderson survived his wife and there was
4. Collins v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 183 S. C. 284, 190 S. E. 847.
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no error in overruling defendant's motion; that they were
asserting survivorship and the burden of proof was upon
them.
Specifically the Court held that "it was reas6nably infer-
able from the evidence that there was no survivorship, and
that, if such was the case, the right of action would accrue
on behalf of the heirs at law of Mrs. Anderson, because, if
their deaths occurred at the same moment, it could not be
said that a cause of action would accrue to Mr. Anderson as
an heir at law of his wife, and that, therefore, the case at bar
was brought for the benefit of the proper parties, to wit, the
heirs at law and distributees of Mrs. Anderson.
The result would have different, however, had the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act been in effect in South Carolina at
the time of this decision. The husband and wife would each
have been considered to survive the other for the purpose of
accruing a cause of action for the death of the other. The
proceeds of any recovery on behalf of the husband for the
death of the wife would have been distributed on the theory,
that he survived his wife and vice versa.
Thus, under the common law, the Courts had no alterna-
tive but to strain for some inference from the circumstances,
failing that, to determine substantial rights by the unrealistic
consideration of the procedural incidence of the burden of
proof. The statute will largely relieve the Courts of that oth-
erwise unescapable predicament, and, since the incidence of
the burden of proof will no longer be the determining factor,
it may be supposed that hereafter very tenuous evidence of
survivorship will not be accepted with the readiness apparent
in the former opinions of our Courts.
A statutory definition of rights accruing where a simul-
taneous death occurs is of much larger moment than might
be indicated by the existence of only three decisions on the
subject by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Laymen, as
well as lawyers engaged in the preparation of wills and trusts,
are conscious of the risk that several members of a family
may die in a common accident in this motorized age when
more and more of life is being lived upon wheels and wings.
Their attempts to provide for such eventualities are constant
but are necessarily cumbersome when there is no firm ground
upon which to start. The common law provided only a nebu-
lous field of uncertainty where substantial rights were de-
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pendent for resolution upon such vagaries as the happenstance
of the incidence of the burden of proof. The testator, the set-
tlor of a trust, whose wishes coincide with the statute, need
no longer make special provision to cover simultaneous death
situations. He who wishes other results to flow from such sit-
uations or to provide for non-simultaneous deaths from com-
mon accidents, may still make provision to effectuate his
wishes and the statute is of some benefit to him in establish-
ing a concrete beginning point.
The adoption of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
marks an advance in the administration of law in South Car-
olina. By specifically providing for the distribution of prop-
erty in the event of simultaneous death, it supplies a long ex-
isting need.
The general purpose of the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act as stated therein is to make uniform the law in those
states which enact it, and Section 7 thereof requires that it
be so construed and interpreted as to effectuate this purpose.
Decisions of other states in which the Uniform Act is
now in effect will, therefore, be valuable in determining ques-
tions arising under the Act in South Carolina.
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